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Summary
Ever increasing number of Android malware, has always been a concern for cybersecurity professionals.
Even though plenty of anti-malware solutions exist, a rational and pragmatic approach for the same is
rare and has to be inspected further. In this paper, we propose a novel two-set feature selection approach
based on Rough Set and Statistical Test named as RSST to extract relevant system calls. To address the
problem of higher dimensional attribute set, we derived suboptimal system call space by applying the
proposed feature selection method to maximize the separability between malware and benign samples.
Comprehensive experiments conducted on a dataset consisting of 3500 samples with 30 RSST derived
essential system calls resulted in an accuracy of 99.9%, Area Under Curve (AUC) of 1.0, with 1% False
Positive Rate (FPR). However, other feature selectors (Information Gain, CFsSubsetEval, ChiSquare,
FreqSel and Symmetric Uncertainty) used in the domain of malware analysis resulted in the accuracy
of 95.5% with 8.5% FPR. Besides, empirical analysis of RSST derived system calls outperform other
attributes such as permissions, opcodes, API, methods, call graphs, Droidbox attributes and network
traces.
KEYWORDS:
Android malware detection, machine learning, system calls, feature selection, rough set, statistical test.
1 INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, Android has beenwidely adopted as the preferred operating systemof smartphones, tablets, and even Internet of Things (IoT)
devices. In particular, smartphones being portable with its extensive computing capabilities have gained widespread attention than personal com-
puters. Reports from 1 state that in 2017 the sale of Android-based smartphones have surpassed 1.32 billion. The smartphone industry is steadily
increasing and estimated to touch 1.71 billion in 2020 1. SinceDecember 2017 1, over 3.5million new apps are being uploaded toGoogle Play Store.
Unfortunately, security issueswithAndroid systemevolve due to the tremendous growth of third-party app stores, which hosts numerousmalware
applications. Recently, Sophos lab 2, reports submission of 10 million Android samples by the end of December 2017, of which 77% of applications
are identified as malware. Notably, the popularity of Android phones and its ubiquitous nature also attracted the adversary to exfiltrate critical
information from compromised devices. Moreover, these malicious apps are used for phone-tapping, steal sensitive information, geographic loca-
tions, and send premium ratemessages. Considering the above-mentioned circumstances, immediate attention is required for enforcing security of
smart devices frommalignant applications.
There are broadly two approaches for malware detection: (a) static analysis and (b) dynamic analysis methods. Traditionally, static analysis is
used to create malware signatures. The sequence of instructions, strings, bits or hashes may be used to express signature. Even though signature-
based techniques can rapidly identify malicious applications, they can be easily evaded by code polymorphism or techniques involving source code
transformation. Additionally, signature-based detector proves ineffective for detecting zero-day malware. Dynamic analysis is also known as a
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behavior-based approach. Here, the antimalware engine evaluates actions of an app to determine if the application demands unauthorized access
to the sensitive resources.
Moreover, several reinforcement solutions are proposed to study the malware codes and its behaviors to realize the threats 3. To be precise,
machine learning-based approaches (MLA) in malware detection have gained increased acceptance due its increase in detection accuracy 4, 5.
In this context, several questions arise: Is it possible to present an Android malware detection framework that categorizes various applications
and distinguishes between themalicious and benign ones?How canwe select significant features, either using static or dynamic analysis, to identify
themalware apps? How canwe construct an optimal feature vector to improve classification? The goal of this paper is to shed light on these issues.
In this paper, we present and investigate malware detection by developing the feature set comprising of system calls. The characteristic of the
feature space is its representative power of exhibiting the behavior of an application. To showcase the indented actions of amonitoring application,
Android Monkey 6 is employed to supply random inputs (in the form of swipes and clicks, etc.) to the sample. Each event triggers the invocation
of a set of the characteristic system calls. The extracted set of attributes might have irrelevant calls that do not help in the process of identifying
malicious applications. Hence, a two-step feature selection method is proposed. Initially, an optimal feature vector is derived by applying rough set
feature selection approach 7,8. Further, to boost the performance of classifiers, we further synthesize the previous attributes using statistical test,
precisely the Large Population Test 9, to generate the list of prominent malware and benign attributes. These features are subsequently utilized to
develop classificationmodel, using algorithms such as AdaBoostM1-J48 10, Random forest 11, and Rotation forest 12. Themain contributions of this
study are summarized as follows:
1. We propose a two-step feature selection approach inspired by the rough set and statistical test (named as RSST), capable of eliminating
irrelevant attributes (i.e., system calls) for improving classifier detection performance.
2. We perform an extensive analysis to investigate the optimal feature vector that depicts enhanced results. This is ascertained by varying the
number of system calls in the feature space. The results of LPT-based feature set exhibited an accuracy of 99.8% with 0.001 False Positive
Rate (FPR).
3. We perform extensive analysis using different categories of features extractedwith static and dynamic analysis. In particular, static features
considered are permissions, opcodes, APIs, and, dynamic features include system calls, network trace, system call graphs and attributes
extracted from Droidbox 13. Moreover, we demonstrate that the performance of classification model created with system calls are better
compared to others.
4. We thoroughly evaluated the performance of our proposed feature selection approachwith other attribute selectors traditionally utilized in
the domain ofmalware detection. The experiments show that set of systemcalls derived byourmethod can separatemalware and legitimate
instances with 99.9% accuracy compared to alternate techniques.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section2discusses the relatedwork inAndroidmalwaredetection. Section3presents ourmethod-
ology. In Section 4, we discuss the experiments, while we also present different setting of experiments to obtain relevant calls. Section 5 presents
the static and dynamic analysis to validate the efficiency of our proposed system call feature set. In Section 6 detection performance of our pro-
posed two-step feature selection model is compared with other attribute selectors. After that, Section 7 describes some essential understandings
and achievements of our solution and related experiments. We holistically compared our method against some state-of-the-art ones in Section 8.
We list the limitations of our method in Section 9. Finally, the conclusion is given in Section 10.
2 RELATED WORK
In the following, we will discuss the solutions adopted for Android malware analysis. Particularly, we will present static (see Section 2.1), dynamic
(see Section 2.2) and hybrid solutions (see Section 2.3) categories. In the following, wewill briefly discuss each category.
2.1 Static Analysis
The paper 14 proposed DREBIN developed with the features extracted from both manifest files and bytecode and embedded all of the attributes
into a joint vector space to detect the malicious apps using support vector machines (SVM). DREBIN detects 94% detection rate of the malware
samples with an FPR of 1%. However, it is quite ineffective at detecting new types of malware because of the enormous size of the feature set.
Authors in 15 present a systematic characterization of Android malware based on method of installation, activation mechanism and malicious
payload.
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Another solution 16 combines application permissions, broadcast receivers, the presence of embedded Android applications and native code.
They adopt random decision trees that built rules comprising of two or three features respectively.
A probabilistic discriminativemodel based on regularized logistic regression for detectingmalicious apps fromdecompiled source codewas pro-
posed by authors in 17. API calls and permissions were used as features. Further, features selection methods i.e., Information gain and Chi-squared
were utilized for determining significant attributes. A comprehensive analysis on datasets collected from different sources was performed. Finally,
classifier performance was evaluated using themetric like precision, recall, and Area Under Curve (AUC).
Droid Detective 18 uses a rule-based approach to classify apps as benign and malware. Combination of permissions together with their fre-
quencies is utilized to create a set of rules. Subsequently, relevant rules essentially discriminating malware and benign samples were extensively
investigated.
Wei et al. 19 proposed a framework for identifying malapps and trusted applications along with the categorization of benign samples into
diverse groups. Feature such as requested/used permissions, filtered intents, code-related information, restricted/suspicious API calls and hard-
ware related attributeswas extracted froma large collection of applications. SupportVectorMachine (SVM)was used to rank attributes. Ensembles
of SVM, CRT, Naive Bayes, Random forest and K-NN was considered to label an app into respective classes. The decision of unseen samples was
arrived usingmajority voting.
2.2 Dynamic Analysis
In 20, authors considered vectorized representation of CPU utilization, network traffic, power andmemory consumption by apps as features. Infor-
mation gain feature selection filtered 10 prominent attributes of total 32 features. Malware detection models employing Random forest, Naive
Bayes, Logistic Regression and Support Vector Machine (SVM) is created. An F-Measure of 0.993 with 0.998 AUC obtained with Random forest
demonstrates the suitability of ensemble classifier for developingmalware classificationmodel.
Authors in 21 presented a detection framework using system calls having the possibility to be implemented in the resource-constrained environ-
ment. To address this issue theyproposedfiltering andabstractionprocess on200popular applications.During thefiltering phase, irrelevant system
calls are eliminated to describe the behaviour of the applications. Later, system calls with identical functions are consolidated. However, we argue
that abstraction phase might lose some important information affecting the identification of malicious samples from legitimate instances. Further,
the return types and parameters passed as an argument to the calls are distinct, thus mapping of multiple calls with few representative ones is not
always feasible.
Authors in 22 present an ML classification system employing 59 Linux based features characterizing memory, CPU, and Network from the
Android OS to detect malicious applications. The analysis was carried out by eliminating a set of attributes to estimate the performance of
classificationmodel. Finally, 36 out of 59 features learnedwith SVM resulted in 98.85% accuracy with 0.67% False Positive Rate.
In 23, TCPpackets during active communicationbetween the infected systemandattacker serverwereused tobuild feature set.ClassifierSubsetE-
val feature selectionmethod implemented inWEKA filtered six out of 11 attributes. The algorithms such as Bayes network, multi-layer perceptron,
decision tree(J48), K-nearest neighbor and Random forest were considered for developing learning models. The experimental results indicated
99.99% accuracy.
A client-side application capable of executing on the device for detecting deviations of legitimate apps from their malicious counterpart was
proposed in 24. The detection system consisted of a machine learning model trained with network trace. The study demonstrated that applications
were easily distinguishable by analyzing the traffic patterns. Thus, the behavior of applications could be modelled by analyzing network behavior .
Verification of whether the application behavior is what it claimed to be could also be performed.
Andromaly a light-weight host-based framework for anomaly detection on Android smartphones was discussed in 25. Andromaly monitors
various system metrics, such as CPU usage, volume of data transferred through network, number of active processes and battery usage. Then,
Andromaly receives the feature vectors frommain service, analyze them (i.e., using rule-based, knowledge-based classifiers or anomaly detectors)
to perform threat assessment with ThreatWeighting Unit (TWU), which is eventually used in the detection process.
In 26, sequence of system calls with different depth was used as features. Initially, set of malicious and benign applications were executed in a
smartphone, later call logs were processed out side the device. System call name was extracted and used to create malicious and legitimate pat-
ternswith respect to experimentally determined threshold value. Experiments conducted on 2000malicious and bengin applications resulted in an
accuracy exceeding 90%.
2.3 Hybrid Analysis
In 27, authors present two-side malicious apps defense scanner using ML technique modelled on Random forest classifier. Firstly, the scanner exe-
cutes the samples in a sandbox environment, and system calls are collected. Secondly, the categorized applications which are labelled as malware
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or benign are rechecked by monitoring the network activity of each app. Finally, Wrongly labelled files were corrected if any application depicted
suspicious network activity.
The detection of smartphone malware using the subset of system calls, the weighted sum of permissions and combination of permissions was
addressed in 28.Experimental study reported statistical difference in open, read, recv and write system calls. They also claim that these system
calls can be used for appropriately classifying malware and trusted applications. The overall precision of approximately 85% was obtained by esti-
mating values for different evaluation parameters. Besides, in 29, authors provide information flow control along with declassification policies on
unannotatedprogramswith support to runtime security labels. Such solution presents hybrid approacheswhich cover dynamic labels and execution
constraints to handle legacy and untrusted andmobile codes.
On the other hand, authors in 30 present Manilyzer exploiting information system that adopts KNN, SVM, and C.45 classification algorithms.
Their results confirm that they have 90% accuracy in the classification of an app corpus over 617 obtained applications. However, as static analysis,
they fail to generalize the patterns of newmalware specimens, where they discuss detection by capturing attributes from network packets.
Authors in 31 present a three-phase detection and classification framework: Permission-Based Detection (PBD), System–Call Based Detec-
tor (SBD), and classificationofmalwares into their respective types. Experiments on thedataset comprisingof 933benign and265malware resulted
in 97% True Positive Rate (TPR) with 3%v False Positive Rate (FPR)and 98% accuracy.
After reviewing the previously published papers, we conclude that the researchers concentrated on improving the outcome of classification by
deriving attributes or using feature selectionmethods commonly used inmachine learning domain. Different frompriorwork, we focused on devel-
oping novel feature selection method for improving results along with investigating robust attributes which can be used for developing effective
malware identificationmodels.
3 PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
In this section, we present our approach for identifying malicious samples. The framework is shown in Fig. 1 . It is designed to contain multiple
phases. In the initial stage, we collect malware and benign samples from multiple data stores. Each sample is installed in an emulator, which is
subsequently interacted with Android Monkey. We use strace command to capture system call on the Android mobile application. System call
logs are processed to filter call names, which are further used as features. In the subsequent phase, the feature set is refined using two-step feature
selection approach. Initially, irrelevant calls are eliminated using rough set approach, later large population test is applied to determine discriminant
system calls. Classificationmodels are developedwith the extracted attribute set, and finally, samples are separated into one of the two classes, i.e.,
either malware or benign. In the subsequent sections, we detail each phase involved in our proposed approach.
FIGURE 1 Proposed framework, n is the subset of reduced features obtained from attributes set ofN dimensions.
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3.1 Dataset Description
The dataset consists of 2000 benign applications which are downloaded fromGoogle Play Store 32, Chinese market 33, Koodous 34, and third-party
Android markets 35 36. Each sample is submitted to VirusTotal 37, an online antimalware service, to confirm applications are indeed legitimate. The
malware dataset constitutes 1500 samples. A total of 554 malicious apps are randomly collected from Drebin project, 450 taken from Koodous-a
collaborative platform for Android Malware analysis, consisting of analysis tools and combine social interactions. Also, a set of 496 ransomware
apps 38 is also used as a part of malware dataset.
3.2 Extraction of System calls
System call logs, during the execution of each sample, are considered as the feature for classifying a file asmalware or benign. Linux system calls can
be categorized based onoperating system functionality such as processmanagement,filemanagement,memorymanagement, devicemanagement,
informationmanagement and communicationmodels. System calls act as an interface between user and kernel. All requests performed at the user
mode are forwarded through a system call interface before its execution through the hardware. At any occasion, if a user intends to make a phone
call using a call application, then the user request is transferred to Telephony Manager Service, to a set of library calls, which in turn results in
multiple invocations of a system call. During the execution of a system call, control is transferred from usermode to kernel mode.When the system
call is completed, then the control is returned back to the user mode. Thus, the interaction of a program with OS can be precisely exhibited by
representing feature set with system calls or sequence of system calls. Moreover, static features (e.g., permissions, metadata, opcodes, API’s, and
intents) are susceptible to change due to obfuscation, however, system calls are relatively resilient to obfuscation comparing attributes extracted
during static analysis.
Each application is installed in Android emulator using adb install command. Initially, we keep track of the zygote process which starts at
init. Whenever a new application is launched, the zygote is forked. Using strace utility, wemonitor the zygote and later filter out the process
id, i.e., pid of the required application. Using Android Monkey, random events consisting of touches, clicks, and gestures, etc. are supplied to the
application. In particular, we subject the application to SMS, phone and direction events one after another, to gather its actual behavior. During
each event, system calls are recorded. Employing Android Monkey, 2500 events are subjected to an application, and the call trace is collected. The
execution trace consists of system call name, parameters and return values. Using a customized parser, we extract call names which are utilized as
features. Following steps are employed to extract system calls.
S1: The .apk files are installed in emulator using adb shell command:
adb -s <emulator-id> install filename.apk
S2: Afterwards, the call trace are recordedwith strace utility 39. The input to the strace is pid and the logfilename.
strace -p <pid> -o sdcard/logfilename
S3: aapt command is run to obtain package name for an apk. The following command is used to interact with an application.
adb shell monkey -p <package-name> -v <# events>
S4: Other fake actions (such as sending SMS, making/receiving calls or setting locations) are performed using some commands shown below:
– Connect to the emulator, using telnet:
telnet localhost 5554
– Tomake a phone call
gsm call<callerPhoneNumber>
– Send an SMS
sms send <senderePhoneNumber> <textMessage>
– To change geo-locations
geo fix <longtitude value> <latitude value>
S5: The log file stored in emulator is copied to the device using adb pull.
adb -s emulator-<id> pull sdcard/logfilename destination-path
S6: The emulator instance is killed and the android device is restored to the previous clean state.
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3.3 Representation of Feature Vector
Thegoal ofmalware classification system is tomapa collectionof applications (or apks) into afixednumberof predefined categories i.e.,malware (M)
or benign (B).Hence, this is a supervised learningproblem. To this end, thepreliminary task is to transformeachapk typically into a groupof features.
Formally speaking, each system call si in this case corresponds to a feature. To adapt attributes into a feature vector, representative calls from
samples are converted to a specific value. In conventional approach, feature vectors are represented as boolean value (presence/absence of an
attribute is expressed as 1/0) or number of times si occurs in the samples. Since, the classification is based on the contents (i.e., system calls), an
attribute weighting scheme known as Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) 40 is utilized. Specifically, elements of each vector are the
TF-IDFweight of a systemcall. This representation of feature vector assigns a higherweight to systemcalls that are typical of a sample, compared to
calls that are relatively rare in thewhole collectionof instances. Thus, a collectionof feature vectors are referred tous as FeatureVector Table (FVT),
which is a data structure consisting of r rows of instances (vectors) andN columns of system call (see Fig. 1 ). As supervised learning is used, each
vector is labeled asmalware (M) or benign (B).
TABLE 1 Representation of Feature Vector Table (FVT). The elements of FVT (tf-idfij) designate the weights of system calls j in the sample i; r is
the number of instances/samples;N is the number of system calls; xj denotes jthmalware/benign sample; and, labelsM andB denoteMalicious and
Benign samples.
SystemCalls
s1 s2 . . . s(N−1) sN Class
x1 tf-idf11 tf-idf12 . . . tf-idf1(N−1) tf-idf1N M
x2 tf-idf21 tf-idf22 . . . tf-idf2(N−1) tf-idf2N M
x3 tf-idf31 tf-idf32 . . . tf-idf3(N−1) tf-idf3N M
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
xk−2 tf-idf(k−2)1 tf-idf(k−2)2 . . . tf-idf(k−2)(N−1) tf-idf(k−2)N B
xk−1 tf-idf(k−1)1 tf-idf(k−1)2 . . . tf-idf(k−1)(N−1) tf-idf(k−1)N B
xk tf-idfk1 tf-idfk2 . . . tf-idfk(N−1) tf-idfkN B
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
xr tf-idfr1 tf-idfr2 . . . tf-idfr(N−1) tf-idfrN B
3.4 Feature Selection Approach
The property of an application that is being measured and characterizes it is known as feature (or attribute). One of the dominant problems in
machine learning over the past is identifying sub-optimal feature vector, having a strength equivalent to full feature space. Feature selection is
a combinatorial optimization problem which aims to minimize redundant or irrelevant attributes. A feature is characterized as redundant if the
information conveyed by the feature is more or less identical to the one or more features. On the contrary, a feature is considered as irrelevant, if it
does not carry essential information for identifying target classes.
Generally speaking, the objective of feature selection approach is to determine an optimal set from a finite set of a large number of attributes or
reduce the number of possible solutions. Thus, in such problems, an exhaustive search is not feasible. Explicitly, in the context ofmalware detection,
set of features (or attributes) are considered relevant if they can potentially identify target classes. Techniques using feature selection attempt
to identify a small subset of attributes based on a fixed criterion. Relevance can be computed using specific statistical or information-theoretic
approaches. Also, feature selection approach derives the useful attributes without changing its physical meaning.
In this work, we applied forward feature selection method. Feature selection was performed using search approach by applying SFE method.
In this regard, the concepts of rough set theory 41 is used. Here, a table is represented as a tuple T = (U,A), where U represents the universe of
instances set (i.e., apk files) and A denote the set of attributes or objects, and a ∈ A is an attribute instance. Let P ⊂ A be the subset of features
obtained by eliminating sparse features. Attribute set is partitioned into a set of conditional attributesC (i.e.,MorB), and a set of decision attributes
D (i.e., system calls), respectively.
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Indiscernibility relation, IND(P), is an equivalence relation defined as in equation (1).
IND(P ) = {(x, y) ∈ U × U, ∀a ∈ P, a(x) = a(y)}, (1)
where a(x) is the feature value of object x; Here a(x) = a(y) denotes that x and y are indiscernible with respect toP; and,U/IND(P) represents all
equivalence classes inP.
L? is the lower approximation ofXwhich represents elements ofU that are surely inX. It denotes by
L? = U{E ∈ U |IND(L) : E ⊂ X}, (2)
L? is the upper approximation of X which represents the set that are possibly classified as elements in X. Equation (3) contains the definition of
upper approximation.
L? = U{E ∈ U |IND(L) : E ∩X 6= φ}, (3)
The positive region is denoted as a set of applications ofU that can be classifiedwith certainty to belong to classesU/IND(D)using attributeC. In
this paper, the significance of feature, i.e., system call, calculated from positive regionPOSC(D) is used as the criteria for feature selection. In order
to construct a feature set, we estimated the reducts of conditional attributes (i.e., set of system calls) with respect to the decision attributes (i.e., the
target classes). Johnson’s greedy algorithm 42 can be used to determine reducts. Thus reducts eliminate all superfluous attributes from the feature
set. Formally, the reduct of an conditional attributeC, w.r.t., decision featuresD is the set of system callsR ⊆ C thatmust be following properties (1)
the classificationmetrics obtainedwithR is similar toC, specifically the positive regions forR andC are identical, therefore,POSR(D) = POSC(D)
and (2) feature set ofR is minimal, thusPOSR−{e}(D) 6= POSR(D). It is represented using Equation (4).
POSC(D) =
⋃
X∈U/IND(D)
CX, (4)
Finally, the significance of decision attributes ({M,B} ∈ D) onC is defined as:
ΨC(D) =
| POSC(D) |
| U | . (5)
where | U | is the cardinality of a set U. A system call s ∈ C is irrelevant in system call set C, if ΨC(D) = ΨC−{s}(D), otherwise s is regarded
as relevant feature in C with respect to target classes (M/B). Therefore, set of attributes in reducts preserves the separation of classes. Subse-
quently, FVT records the TF-IDF score of system calls. These scores are mapped into four bins, where bin B1 is defined to contain TF-IDF values
between 0.0-0.25, B2 contains values between 0.26-0.5, B3 contains values between 0.51-0.75, and B4 contains values between 0.76-1.0. Finally
this representation of feature vector table is used to determine relevant attributes in the feature space.
The selection of a suitable/relevant subset of systemcalls are explainedwith steps listed inAlgorithm1 and2. Specifically, inAlgorithm1, the line
numbers 8 to 13 generate a set X consisting of apks with identical values of conditional and decision attributes. Similarly, steps 14 to 18 is used to
create a setYwith apks having similar values of the conditional attributes but with dissimilar decision attributes. Steps 19-22 append the elements
of sets X and Y to the dictionaries P and N, respectively. The cardinality of set P is subsequently used to determine the significance/dependency
value of each system call k, illustrated in line number 29. The system call with highest significance/dependency value is determined (steps 30 to 33)
and returned to the procedure for generating reducts (i.e., Algorithm2). InAlgorithm2, the procedure for computing reducts takes threeparameters
as input: a significant system call S, set of conditional attributes A, and decision attributes D. Algorithm 2 starts with the most significant system
call. Subsequently, applies a forward approach to incrementally add attributes to reductR that has the highest significance value, refer line numbers
8-10.
Complexity Analysis: The time spent for computing reducts are related to the amount of comparison of feature vector, and all possible values
of the vectors. In our case, the continuous values of elements are mapped to one of the possible bins ({B1,B2,B3,B4}). In our case, we have two
classes and four bins, hence, we have 8 possible cases. Thus, maximum values of feature vector cannot be more than 8× | U |, which itself is a huge
number.Moreover, an in-accurate design of algorithmwould requireO(C · U2) as the worst case time complexity. However, in our implementation,
feature vectors are represented as a binary tree. In a nutshell, in our solution, the overall worst case time complexity for comparing feature vectors
is estimated asO(C · log U) O(C · U2).
3.5 An Illustrative Example
Let us consider an example to illustrate the selection of relevant system calls using the proposed feature selection approach. To demonstrate the
procedure, wemake use of an example feature vector table as shown in Table 2 . There are three system calls (i.e., s1, s2, s3), seven applications (i.e.,
x1-x7) and a decision attributeD. The decision attribute consists of two valuesM orB. In this example, each application xi is represented as a vector,
the elements of a vector is mapped to bins, i.e., {B1,B2,B3,B4} for a system call sj (see Table 2 ).
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Algorithm 1 System call with highest significant/dependency value.
INPUT: U;A;D;V
OUTPUT: S U: All apk files
1: A: Set of system calls
2: D: Set of decision attributes
3: S: Set of system call with highest significance/dependency value
4: V[n][k]: Feature occurrence matrix with n samples & k system calls
5: for k inA do
6: for i← 1 to | U | do . flag[i] denote a call included in a setX. The functionmatch(i,j) compares system calls i and j using binary search tree.
7: flag[i] = 1;
8: for j← i + 1 to | U | do
9: if (flag[j]==0) and match(V[i][k],V[j][k]) and (D[i]==D[j]) then
. x is a list of system calls with identical feature value and decision attribute
10: X = X∪ {j};
11: flag[j] = 1; . fromX is a flag, denotes a system call is appended to listX.
12: fromX = 1;
13: end if
14: end for
15: if (flag[j]==0) and match(V[i][k],V[j][k]) and (D[i]6=D[j]) then
16: Y = Y∪ {j};
17: fromY = 1;
18: end if
19: end for
20: if (fromX) then .P is a dictionary of calls with identical values of feature& decision attribute.
21: P[k][++l].append(X);
22: fromX = 0;
23: else .N is a dictionary of calls with identical feature values& different decision attribute.
24: N[k][++l].append(Y);
25: fromy = 0;
26: end if
27: if (flag[i-1] == 0) then
28: P[k][++l].append(i);
29: end if .ComputeΨs(D) i.e., significance/dependency value for system call k.
30: Ψ[k]← P[k]|U|
31: ifΨ[k] >maxΨ then
32: maxΨ← Ψ[k];
33: S← S ∪ k;
34: end if
35: for i← 1 to | U | do
36: flag[i] = 0;
37: end for
38: end for
39: return S
The procedure begins with an empty set of reductR. Each system call is selected and its significance is computed, using Equation 5. The call with
highest significance value is selected and assigned to the reduct setR (refer Algorithms 1 and 2). In this example, system call s3 is added toR.
U/AD = {{x2, x3, x5, x7︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
}, {x1, x4, x6}︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
},
U/As1 = {{x1, x6︸ ︷︷ ︸
B1
}, {x3, x4}︸ ︷︷ ︸
B2
, {x5, x7}︸ ︷︷ ︸
B3
},
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Algorithm 2Generate Reducts
INPUT: S;A;D
OUTPUT: R
S: a system call with highest significance/dependency value
A: be set of system calls
D: set of decision attributes
R: reduct
1: R := S;
2: temp := R; .A \ R consists of all elements ofAwhich are not elements ofR
3: for s∈ (A\R) do
4: ifΨR∪s > Ψtemp then
5: temp := R ∪ {s};
6: end if
7: R := temp;
8: end for
9: returnR
TABLE 2 Mapping System calls to bins. Bin B1 ranges from 0.0 to 0.25, B2 is from 0.26-0.5, B3 lies between 0.56-0.75 and finally B4 is between
0.76-1.0.
Samples s1 s2 s3 D
x1 B1 B4 B1 B
x2 B2 B1 B2 M
x3 B2 B1 B2 M
x4 B2 B2 B1 B
x5 B3 B2 B4 M
x6 B1 B2 B3 B
x7 B3 B2 B3 M
Ψs1 =
| {x5, x7} |
| {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7} |
=
2
7
= 0.28,
U/As2 = {{x2, x3︸ ︷︷ ︸
B1
}, {x4, x5, x6, x7}︸ ︷︷ ︸
B2
, {x1}︸︷︷︸
B4
},
Ψs2 =
| {x1, x2, x3} |
| {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7} |
=
3
7
= 0.42,
U/As3 = {{x1, x4︸ ︷︷ ︸
B1
}, {x2, x3}︸ ︷︷ ︸
B2
, {x6, x7}︸ ︷︷ ︸
B3
, {x5}︸︷︷︸
B4
},
Ψs3 =
| {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5} |
| {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7} |
=
5
7
= 0.71,
∴ R← {s3},
Subsequently other attributes (s1 or s2) are added to R by evaluating the significance of a system call with each attributes in R (i.e, s3). Hence, a
forward feature selection strategy is employed.
U/A{s1,s3} = {{x1}{x2, x3}, {x5}, {x6}, {x7}},
Ψ{s1,s3} =
| {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7} |
| {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7} |
=
7
7
= 1.0,
U/A{s2,s3} = {{x2, x3}{x1}, {x4}, {x5}, {x6, x7}},
Ψ{s2,s3} =
| {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5} |
| {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7} |
=
5
7
= 0.714,
∴ R← {s1, s3}.
Finally, the feature set {s1, s3} is considered as feature set and eventually utilized to construct classificationmodel.
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3.6 Classification Phase
After the construction of feature set, our system creates classification models using three algorithms. In contrast to conventional signature-based
scanners, themachine learning-basedmodels require fewer updates, due to the fact that less number ofmalware is reported to formnew families 43.
We employ commonly used classification algorithms reported in malware detection process. Classification algorithms such as Random forest 11,
Rotation forest 12, AdaBoost (with J48 as base classifier) implemented inWEKA 44 are considered.
3.7 Evaluation Parameters
To evaluate the effectiveness of our proposedmethod, we used classical evaluationmetrics applied in machine learning;
• True Positive (TP): it indicates number of malicious applications that are appropriately identified.
• True Negative (TN): it denotes the number of accurately classified benign instances.
• False Positive (FP): it signifies the number of wrongly classified benign instances as malware applications.
• False Negative (FN): it indicates malware instances wrongly classified as legitimate application.
Using abovementioned criteria, followingmetrics are used tomeasure the effectiveness of our proposed system:
• Accuracy (Acc): Acc is the number of applications that the classifier correctly detects, divided by the number of malicious and legitimate
applications.
Acc =
TP + TN
TP + FN + TN + FP
. (6)
• False Positive Ratio (FPR): FPR is the number of misclassified legitimate applications, divided by the number of benign applications.
FPR =
FP
FP + TN
. (7)
• AreaUnderCurve (AUC):AUC is used to combine FPR andTPR together 45. In particular, AUCmeasures the tradeoff betweenTPR and FPR.
Intrinsic goal of AUC is to solve situation where data set consists of imbalanced samples (or skewed sample distribution), and it is required
that themodel is not over-fitted to class consisting of higher number of instances. The value of AUC is between 0 and 1, AUC value 1means
the prediction is appropriate, it is reasonable if the value is greater than 0.5, however, if the value is less than 0.5, then we must reverse the
decision of classificationmodel.
AUC =
1
2
(
TP
TP + FP
+
TN
TN + FP
)
. (8)
4 EVALUATION OF RESULTS
The experiments are conducted on systemwith Intel core i7, 2GHz quad-core processor and 8GB internalmemory.We evaluate each classification
model by a 10-fold cross-validation [40],[20] procedure to develop optimum model having improved generalization capability. Dataset is divided
into ten equal subsets with 90% of the set used for developing training model and remaining 10% of instances used as test set. Extensive analysis
are performed on extracted features using static and dynamicmechanisms. Following sections present the experiments and analysis of the work.
4.1 Performance obtained with System call attributes
The effectiveness of classification system is evaluated under following settings:
1. Outcome of classification obtainedwith prominent benign system calls
2. Performance of model developed using set of malicious system calls
3. Classifier results ascertained with subset of feature space derived using statistical test. Furthermore, the analysis is conducted using
significant benign andmalicious system call set.
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4.1.1 Evaluation on significant benign attributes
The trusted application is executed in the emulator and applying the procedure discussed in Section 3; we extract system call names. The collection
of call names are considered as attributes. Later, irrelevant attributes are removed using feature selection approach discussed in Section 3.4. Using
filtered system calls, classificationmodels are generated, and the performance is evaluatedwith 10-fold cross-validation.Weobserve that Rotation
forest and Random forest relatively yield similar performance. Table 3 shows the weighted average of different metrics (refer to the last row),
both Rotation forest and Random forest resulted in AUC value 1.0, with an accuracy in the range of 99.42-99.54%, and FPR of 0.005 and 0.01,
respectively.
In Table 3 , we see that Random forest 11 with 80 system calls result in an AUC value of 1.0 with an FPR of 0.003. Model created with Rotation
forest 12 provides an AUC value of 1.0 using 50 system calls. However, the best outcome (i.e., FPR of 0.009 and AUC of 0.972) with AdaBoost is
obtainedwith 80 attributes.
TABLE 3 Performance obtained with system calls extracted from benign samples. Accuracy and FPR are shown in percentage. The values of AUC
are in range of 0-1.
Feature Random forest Rotation forest AdaBoostM1
Length Acc FPR AUC Acc. FPR AUC Acc FPR AUC
10 99.063 0.009 1.0 97.659 0.025 0.999 77.157 0.258 0.823
20 99.156 0.004 1.0 98.313 0.018 1.0 89.316 0.108 0.962
30 99.250 0.008 1.0 99.813 0.002 1.0 91.471 0.089 0.964
40 99.625 0.004 1.0 99.813 0.002 1.0 90.253 0.099 0.969
50 99.531 0.005 1.0 100 0 1.0 90.534 0.097 0.969
60 99.531 0.005 1.0 99.906 0.001 1.0 89.784 0.106 0.968
70 99.250 0.008 1.0 100 0 1.0 89.972 0.105 0.968
80 99.719 0.003 1.0 99.906 0.001 1.0 90.347 0.101 0.972
90 99.531 0.005 1.0 100 0 1.0 90.347 0.101 0.972
92 99.531 0.005 1.0 100 0 1.0 90.347 0.101 0.972
Average 99.42 0.005 1.0 99.54 0.005 1.00 88.95 0.12 0.95
std-deviation 0.220 0.002 0 0.837 0.009 0 4.182 0.050 0.046
4.1.2 Performance on malware attributes
Weobserve fromTable4 thatRandomforest providedanAUC in rangeof0.99-1.0withFPRbetween0.005-0.013andaccuracy in rangeof99.344-
99.787%. The weighted average of evaluation metrics obtained for Random forest is better compared to Rotation forest and AdaBoostM1. Also,
highest accuracy of 99.782%with 10 system calls are obtainedwith Random forest, proving its efficacy for constructingmalware detectionmodel.
4.2 Evaluation of a set system calls employing large population test
As smartphones have limited computing resources, hence lightweight machine learning model is required to be installed on such devices. Keeping
this in mind, we resort to applying two-step feature selection approach. Initially, system call set is synthesized by implementing Rough set-based
feature selection. Subsequently, the attributes as mentioned earlier are further pruned by using statistical test, in particular, large population test,
hence the method named as RSST. Two sample large population test are used to estimate if the population means differs 9. Specifically, we apply a
statistical test to determine set of system calls having increased divergence across the target classes. To carry this task, we consider same attribute
set supplied to feature selection approach discussed in Section 3.4. Specifically, the system call set used to build previousmaliciousmodel is further
filtered using large population test. A similar approach is again repeated for feature set extracted from benign applications. The result of statistical
method prunes around 50% features. The significance is determined using a two-tailed test. Thus, the null hypothesis (H0) and the alternative
hypothesis (H1) are defined as below:
• Null Hypothesis (H0): Themean of system calls in malware and benign applications are the same.
• Alternate Hypothesis (H1): Themean of system calls in malware and benign set has significant difference.
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TABLE 4 Performance obtainedwith system calls that are extracted frommalware samples.
Feature Random Forest Rotation Forest AdaBoostM1
Length Acc(%) FPR(%) AUC Acc(%) FPR(%) AUC Acc(%) FPR(%) AUC
10 99.782 0.013 0.999 94.845 0.05 0.988 74.157 0.167 0.898
20 99.438 0.006 0.999 94.845 0.05 0.988 86.129 0.138 0.94
30 99.156 0.009 0.999 99.25 0.008 0.999 86.129 0.138 0.94
40 99.531 0.005 1.0 99.813 0.002 1.0 86.036 0.139 0.947
50 99.531 0.005 1.0 99.719 0.003 1.0 87.816 0.139 0.949
60 99.531 0.005 1.0 99.906 0.001 1.0 89.316 0.106 0.968
70 99.438 0.006 1.0 99.906 0.001 1.0 90.815 0.097 0.973
80 99.438 0.006 1.0 100 0 1.0 90.815 0.097 0.973
90 99.344 0.007 1.0 100 0 1.0 90.347 0.101 0.972
92 99.344 0.007 1.0 100 0 1.0 90.347 0.101 0.972
Average 99.453 0.007 1.0 98.828 0.012 0.998 87.191 0.122 0.953
std-deviation 0.163 0.002 0 2.111 0.020 0.005 4.995 0.025 0.024
The difference in mean of system call i ∈ X is computed for both malware and benign set. The evidence of test is computed at the significance
levelα = 0.05 using equation (9).
z =
X
i
M −XiB√
σiM
|M| +
σiB
|B|
, (9)
whereXiM andXiB, denote means of system call i in the classes (malware/benign). Likewise, σiM and σiB are the standard derivations of system call i.
The null hypothesis for a two-tailed test is rejected, if and only if, z ≤ 1.96 and z ≥ 1.96, indicating a significant difference in themean of the system
call in target classes.Onexamining theoutcomeof the result, 50%of systemcalls havinga small difference inmeansareexcluded. Inotherwords, the
attribute space is constructedwith the system calls that qualify the statistical test. Therefore, two feature list, one consisting of calls predominantly
found in malware samples, and another set of dominant calls in the legitimate instances. Identical to previous experiments, evaluation metrics are
measuredwith the variable amount of features, considered in increments of 10 systemcalls at a time.Overall 92 attributeswere observed to satisfy
z− test.
4.2.1 RSST-based Benign System calls
We observe from Table 5 that Random forest provided an AUC value of 1.0 with a false positive rate of 0.001 at a feature length of 30. However,
Rotation forest results in AUC value 1.0 with 30 system calls. AdaBoost again illustrates an FPR of 0.009 and AUC of 0.969with 38 features (found
to comply statistical test). Average evaluationmetrics show similar trends in the results for Random forest andRotation forest. An important aspect
to be noticed is the improvement in the performance of AdaBoost compared to previous experiments, as discussed in sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2,
respectively.
TABLE 5 Result based on system calls invoked by benign applications obtained by applying RSST.
Feature Random Forest Rotation Forest AdaBoostM1
Length Acc FPR AUC Acc FPR AUC Acc FPR AUC
10 99.531 0.005 1.0 99.531 0.005 1.0 90.73 0.009 0.969
20 99.625 0.004 1.0 99.906 0.001 1.0 89.7 0.107 0.967
30 99.906 0.001 1.0 99.812 0.001 1.0 89.7 0.107 0.967
38 99.812 0.002 1.0 99.906 0.001 1.0 90.637 0.009 0.969
Average 99.719 0.003 1.0 99.789 0.002 1.0 90.192 0.058 0.968
std-deviation 0.171 0.002 0 0.177 0.002 0 0.569 0.057 0.001
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4.2.2 RSST-based Malware System calls
In Table 6 , we observe that average evaluationmetrics obtainedwith RandomForest andRotation forest are approximately similar to the previous
experiments. Random forest results in anAUCvalue of 1.0with the false positive rate of 0.001 at a feature length of 30.While, Rotation forest gives
anAUCvalue 1.0with 20 system calls. AdaBoost demonstrates an average evaluationmetrics comparedwith the results produced in sections 4.1.1
and 4.1.2, interestingly with better a FPR.
TABLE 6 Performance based on system calls invoked bymalware applications obtained by applying RSST.
Feature Random Forest Rotation Forest AdaBoostM1
Length Acc FPR AUC Acc FPR AUC Acc FPR AUC
10 99.221 0.019 0.998 99.532 0.005 1.0 81.361 0.176 0.874
20 99.532 0.005 1.0 99.906 0.001 1.0 87.828 0.121 0.937
30 99.906 0.001 1.0 99.813 0.002 1.0 89.513 0.107 0.955
38 99.625 0.003 1.0 99.906 0.001 1.0 90.637 0.009 0.969
Average 99.571 0.007 1.0 99.789 0.002 1.0 87.335 0.103 0.934
std-deviation 0.282 0.008 0.001 0.177 0.002 0 4.146 0.070 0.042
Figure 2 shows the z-score value of prominent system calls participating in the system call space. These calls satisfy alternative hypothesis
depicting substantial variance amongst feature vectors in target classes.
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FIGURE 2 Discriminant System calls invoked bymalware/benign applications.
5 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH STATIC AND DYNAMIC FEATURES
In order to validate the efficiency of system call feature set for identifying malicious instances, we further conducted series of experiments using
diverse attributes/variables extracted using static and dynamic analysis. The framework of our experiment is shown in Fig. 3 . Here, we also esti-
mate the result using F-measure along with the metrics used in all previous experiments. F-measure or F-score can be interpreted as weighted
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average of precision and recall, where low false positive rate indicates precision and low false negative rate relates to recall. F-measure reaches its
best value at 1 andworst score at 0. The F-measure is harmonicmean of precision and recall. Inmost of the classification problemwe have trade-off
between precision and recall. If one of the parameters amongst precision and recall is favoured, the harmonic mean quickly decreases. However,
F-measure is greatest when both precision and recall are equal.
Feature set using static analysis are formed by reversing AndroidManifest.xml and collection of smali files. In particular, attributes such as
permissions, hardware components, app components, opcodes, andmethods are considered. Additionally, features are collected by executing apks.
Specifically, we derived attributes from .pcap files (i.e., network-based features), system call graphs and information filtered using Droidbox. The
following section introduces aforementioned variables and the performance achieved by developing classificationmodels incorporating them.
FIGURE 3 Framework of malware scanner using static and dynamic features.
5.1 Evaluation on Static Features
Static features are extracted from Android Manifest.xml and smali code of each applications. As discussed in previous experiments, each apk
is transformed to a vector representation, which are used to create feature occurrence matrix. Later, prominent attributes are derived by applying
feature selection approach as discussed earlier. The classificationmodels are evaluated and the obtained results are shown in Table 7 .
Tabulated results demonstrate better performance for permissions comparing to the other statistical attributes. An application is not installed
until a user accept all requested permissions. Developersmay sometime declare permissions, which are not originally needed by an apk. Specifically,
such applications are over-privileged and expose devices to threat. The top 5 permissions demanded by malicious applications are INTERNET,
READ_PHONE_STATE, WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE, READ_SMS and WRITE_SMS.
Machine learning system based on permissions can be defeated by having applications initially request fewer permissions during installation
time. In particular, an adversary may create malicious applications to have an uniform statistical distribution of permissions as in benign dataset.
Later, application(s) during execution may demand additional permissions. Under this scenario, the developed models will yield higher misclas-
sification rate. Studies in 46 report ex-filtration of sensitive data from the devices with the apps demanding zero permissions during installation.
While authors in 47 illustrate zero permission app could be used to infer user’s location, traveled routes using accelerometer, magnetometer and
gyroscope.
External storage like SD Card contains sensitive data such as pictures, videos, configuration files, and backup documents, etc. Generally,
applications have read-only access to the SD Card, allowing the attacker to fetch list of installed files. Alternatively, an adversary can query
/data/system/packages.list to find list of installed applications, and subsequently determines exploits to compromise smartphones.
Additionally, basic device information such as kernel version, device ID, and customROMcan be distilled having access to /proc/version file.
Table 7 shows the performance obtained by considering permissions. Extracted permissions are represented as binary vectors. The presence of
a permission is denoted by 1 and absence by 0.With 100 significant permissions, an F1-measure of 0.952with FPRof 0.074 is obtained. Permissions
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TABLE 7 Performance with static features obtained at optimal feature length.
Features Feature TPR(%) FPR F1-measure
Length
Permission 100 95.2 0.074 0.952
Activity 7000 93.4 0.142 0.932
Action 500 90.6 0.198 0.903
Hardware 650 79.9 0.529 0.74
Provider 800 72.5 0.70 0.617
Receiver 5000 90.3 0.237 0.897
Service 3500 90.7 0.231 0.901
Average - 87.51 0.301 0.848
Malware(OPCODE) 400 94.7 0.113 0.98
Benign (OPCODE) 208 94.1 0.11 0.942
Average - 94.4 0.112 0.961
Malware(API) 2550 91.2 0.189 0.908
Benign(API) 1400 89.8 0.236 0.902
Average - 90.5 0.212 0.905
Malware(methods) 2500 88.65 0.061 0.919
Benign(methods) 6500 91.58 0.145 0.909
Average - 90.12 0.103 0.914
are ineffective for identifying malicious samples. In the outlook of end-user, list of permissions are generally viewed as a license agreement. It does
not relate to the context of risk and neither indicates how much hazardous is the installed application. Besides, some permissions are frequently
used bymany applications thus the users do not care about them.
Furthermore, analysis is performed by extracting instructions from each smali code. Generally, an instruction is composed of mnemonics and
list of operands. In order to create feature set we considered mnemonics neglecting the operands. Prominent opcodes are selected with feature
selection, two models are constructed: (a) one with relevant benign opcodes, and (b) another using malware opcodes. F1-measure of 0.98 was
obtainedwith 400malware opcodes (see Table 7 ).We debate that opcodes/ngrams of opcodes cannot be effective in detecting unknownmalware
samples, as they canbeeasily obfuscated. Specifically, trivial obfuscationmethods suchas renamingof class/method/identifier can thwart detection.
Consequently, scanners based on statistical signatures will imprecisely identify new samples.
As an extension to the experiments,we extractAPI frommalware and trusted applications. An F1-measure of 0.908 is obtained consideringAPI’s
(see Table 7 ).We thus argue that API’s areweak attributes, as performance is inferior compared to permissions and opcodes. Present daymalware
employs reflection, so the applications refer malicious codes/libraries during execution. Malicious intentions are invisible during static analysis, as
the set of API’s in both malware and benign set appear identical. Since the distribution of attributes across feature vectors are likely to be uniform
in the target classes, the classifier assigns incorrect labels to the apks.
5.2 Evaluation on Dynamic Features
To evaluate our scheme, we conducted experiments by executing applications. Further feature set are created using network trace, DroidBox infor-
mation and system call graphs. The performance obtained with these features are compared with the set of system calls derived on applying the
two-step feature selection approach (i.e., feature set created by applying rough set followed by large population test.). To practically show the
efficiency of our scheme, the attributes and classification results are discussed in the following subsections.
5.2.1 DroidBox attributes
DroidBox consists of twomodules, one is the Host, and another is the Target. The Target inherits functionalities of TaintDroid, a dynamic taint anal-
ysis tool. It is launched from an emulator whichmonitors data at a low level. The Host part is a collection of Python scripts. The Host links emulator
and receives information from the Target about the application being monitored. Finally, the outcome of the analysis is displayed in graphical or
textual format. Few important information/sections retrieved fromDroidBox are listed below:
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1. accessedFiles-a list of files accessed by the application.
2. cryptousage-operations associated with cryptAPIAndroid.
3. dataleaks-gives user’s data leak information.
4. fdaccess-application performs read/write operations on files.
5. opennet/closenet-open or close a socket.
6. recvnet/sendnet-receive or transmit via network.
7. sendsms/phonecall-send sms or call specific number.
The DroidBox tracing file is a record of actions in JSON format. Largely all sections in the JSON file have the following format.
"Section name":{
"Time of operation"{
"Parameter (e.g., for accessedFiles,Ão˝
Ãnˇpath of the accessed file)
}
}
Consider an example shown below, the application being monitored repeatedly accessed same files, i.e., abc.png and
imagesÃs´12345Ãs´54321-example.jpg, may indicate suspicious activity.
[formatcom=\sffamily]
ÃnˇaccessedFilesÃo˝: {
Ãnˇ100010001: Ãnˇ/mnt/sdcard/Download/abc.jpgÃo˝,
Ãnˇ1000112345Ão˝: Ãnˇ/mnt/sdcard/Download/Ão˝
ÃnˇimagesÃs´12345Ãs´54321-example.jpgÃo˝,
Ãnˇ1000112450Ão˝: Ãnˇ/mnt/sdcard/Download/abc.jpgÃo˝,
Ãnˇ1000113500Ão˝: Ãnˇ/mnt/sdcard/Download/Ão˝
ÃnˇimagesÃs´12345Ãs´54321-example.jpgÃo˝,
&lt;ÃU˝&gt;
}
Using the section and its associated fields/parameters, we represent each app vector in the form of integers (i.e., occurrence of operation along
with its parameters). Table 8 depicts the performance obtainedwith DroidBox.
5.2.2 Network trace
Network traffic are extracted using tcpdump 48 after installing application in emulator. Like the earlier experimental setting used for system call
analysis, AndroidMonkey is used to interactwith theapplication. Thenetwork traffic is recordeduntilfixed randomevent existed. Finally, theoutput
of network trace is recorded in a .pcap file. The basic structure of tcpdump output is shown below:
{timestamp} {network protocol} {source ip}.{source port}> {dest ip}. {dest port}
Subsequently, we extract six features and classification model is built. An AUC of 0.994 with an FPR value of 0.033 (refer Table 8 ) is obtained
using six features listed below:
1. Raw traffic size (RS): is the total packet size estimated at the time frame of analysis.
2. Number of packets(PN): count of packets in a pcap file.
3. Average length of packet(AL): average length of packets for each pcap file.
4. Outbound packets in a file(ON): is number of packets transmitted from a source IP to the others.
5. Inbound packets in a file(IN): number of packets received by a source IP.
6. Total outbound and inbound packets(OIN): sum total of inbound and out-band packets.
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5.2.3 System call graph
In order to ascertain relationships among the logged system calls, a directed graphG =< V,E > is constructed, whereV is the set of vertices andE
is the set of edges. In particular, the graph is represented in the form of the adjacencymatrix. For each pair of extracted system calls, edge between
the vertices are created. The weight of edge is incremented for each appearance of system call pairs. Subsequently, we compute in-degree, out-
degree, standard deviations of in-degree/out-degree, which is used as features for building the classification model. Table 8 exhibits the classifier
outcome with graph based features. We noticed that detection performance of graph-based features are better than attributes obtained from
network trace andDroidBox. This indicates that the interactions of an application with the operating system (using system calls) definitely appears
to be strong candidate for developingmalware detection system.
TABLE 8 Results with features obtain with dynamic analysis.
Features Feature TPR(%) FPR AUC
Length
DroidBox 25 91.7 0.083 0.983
Network 6 96.1 0.033 0.994
System call graph 350 97.45 0.224 0.994
6 PERFORMANCE WITH CONVENTIONAL FEATURE SELECTION APPROACH
In this section, we briefly introducewell-known feature selection algorithms used in the domain ofmalware analysis. These algorithms select a sub-
set of system calls which typically output enhanced classification rate. In particular, feature selection algorithms: Information Gain(IG), Chi-Square
(CHI), Correlation-based Filter (CFS) andWrapper Subset Evaluator (WSE) are utilized to select relevant attributes before developing classification
model. We have selected open source implementation of presented algorithms included in WEKA. Eventually, the detection performance of our
proposed two-step feature selectionmodel is comparedwith themodels developed from aforementioned feature selection algorithms.
Information Gain (IG) is based on the concept of information theory. In thismethod, the algorithm calculates the amount of information carried by
as system call (s). IG(s) involves computing entropy of a classH(C) and subtracting the conditional entropy of s after observing the class, i.e.,H(s|C).
Hence, for a classification system, IG(s) is expressed using equations (10)-(12).
IG(s) = H(C)−H(s|C), (10)
H(s) = −
∑
s∈A
p(s) log2(p(s)), (11)
H(s|C) = −
∑
{M,B}∈C
p(C)
∑
s∈A
p(C|s) log2(p(C|s)), (12)
Finally, IG(s) of all system calls are arranged in descending order, and the top system calls are used for modeling. Chi-Square(CHI) feature selection
is used to test the independence of two events. In our case, the two events are occurrence of a system call and presence of the class. Precisely, we
want to evaluate whether the occurrence of a system call and class are independent. Our aim is to determine set of calls such that its presence and
class are highly dependent. Importance of a system call s is calculated using equation (13).
χ2 (s) =
N(AD − CB)2
(A+ C)× (B +D)× (A+B)× (C +D) , (13)
where N is the total number of apks (N = A + B + C + D), A and B are the number of malware and benign applications containing the system
call s, C and D are number of malware and benign instances without s. Like IG(s), system calls are sorted based on χ2 value, finally we select the
top ranked system call for developing classification model. Symmetric Uncertainty (SU) neutralizes the bias induced by IG towards higher values and
normalizes it in rangeof [0,1]. SymmetricUncertainty is themeasureof information contained in variablesAandCput togetherover the information
independently contained inA andC. The value 1 indicates that knowledge of one variable can determine another attribute. Additionally, it denotes
two variables are highly correlated. On the other hand value 0 signifies independence of variables. Symmetric Uncertainty is defined as:
SU(A,C) = 2.
IG(A|C)
H(A) +H(C)
. (14)
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System calls having higher correspondencewith the class are used for developing classificationmodels.CfsSubsetEval is a correlation-based feature
selection approach. The algorithm selects predominant attributes/system calls based on two aspects (i) correlation of an attribute and class must
be high. It assures the relevance of system call and a class(M/B), and (ii) the set of system calls obtained from the previous step must not have high
correlation amongst each other (higher correlation means larger redundancy). In other words, features/calls are effective if its correlation with
class is large, and all its redundant groups are discarded.Wrapper Subset Evaluator (WSE) looks for attributes along-with the given classifier. Hence,
in the process of finding subset of calls, certain search mechanisms are used. Hence, we employed two well known search approach i.e., Genetic
search (GS) and Breadth First Search (BFS) respectively.
After applying the aforementioned feature selectionmethods, list of relevant system calls are obtained. These set of system calls constitute our
feature set. The performance of classification is determined by varying the length of features. We can see clearly that high accuracy and AUC is
obtained with our proposed feature selector on comparing IG, CHI, SU, CFS, andWSE (both BFS and GS search techniques). Figures 4 a-4 c show
the achieved outcomes. In particular, accuracies obtained with conventional approaches are between 89-92%, AUC is in range of 0.96-0.97 and
FPR lies between 0.08-0.11 respectively. Since the implementations of algorithms: CFS andWSE in WEKA returns a single subset of system calls,
we estimated the performance of the models on these subsets. CFS reported an accuracy of 90.28%, with FPR of 0.0971 and AUC of 0.966 at 14
attributes. WSE (BFS search) resulted in 79.16% accuracy with 0.241 FPR and 0.832 AUC at with two significant calls. Additionally, usingWSE (GS
search) we obtained 84.4% accuracy with an FPR of 0.157 and AUC value of 0.918.
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FIGURE 4 Comparisons of feature selection methods on ACC, AUC and FPR over various length of selected features. IG: Information Gain; CHI:
Chi-Square; SU: Symmetrical Uncertainty; RS (B): Rough set-benign system calls; and RS (M): Rough set-malware system calls.
We note that, the performance of classification models created from conventional feature selection approaches are not better. Hence, perfor-
mance assessment of combined systemcall set is undertaken. The combined feature set include collectionof attributes from individual classification
models which is supposed to produce improved results. In particular set of 16, 17, 30, 50 and 50 significant calls filtered with WFS (GS), CFS, IG,
CHI, and SU are grouped together. Finally, we obtain 54 unique calls by combining the previous outputs. Specifically, the aforementioned attribute
set is created to retain system calls with reasonable predictive capabilities from several models in order to achieve increased detection. Eventually,
the best outcomes of this experiment are 91.5% accuracy, with 0.085 FRP and 0.972 as AUC.We thus conclude that combined feature space does
not improve detection as opposed to selectors independently considered. To validate this, the feature set is inspected and we noticed it to be aug-
mented with irrelevant calls. Hence a comprehensive approach for feature fusion 49 is required to be investigated, which is not within the scope of
the present study, andwill be considered in the future experiments.
7 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss important conclusions drawn based on the investigations conducted through multiple experiments. Particularly, the
inferences are summarized on the following interpretations:
(1) The performance of detection reported with the feature set comprising of system calls, call graph attributes and network traces are competi-
tively the best compared to the static features. An app may utilize reflection and native code 50,51 to make its real program logic undetectable
by static analysis. One of the important conclusions drawn from extensive experiments is that behaviour of malicious and benign samples are
appropriately representedwith attributes derived from thedynamic analysis. Static analysis is not resilient to typical obfuscation techniques 52.
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Statistics from 53 report interesting facts like 43% of Google Play Store apps are obfuscated, 73% of third-party markets and 63.5% of mali-
cious apps use identifier renaming to obfuscate applications. Moreover, the same study demonstrated that malware authors employ string
encryption to hide true intentions of themalicious code, which is rarely observed in legitimate applications. Besides, source code can be conve-
niently altered using ProGaurd 54, an obfuscation tool. Additionally, solution based on static control flow analysis can be defeated by adopting
DashO 55 a Java and Android obfuscator. Thus, the machine learning based solution depending on static features is supposed to give higher
misclassification rate. Studies in 53 state that trusted applications are equally obfuscated as with malicious counterparts. This is performed in
order to optimize the bytecode and protect benign apks against code reversing attacks. The aforesaid, obfuscation techniques do not affect the
performance of machine learning approaches utilizing system calls and features derived from system call graphs.
(2) It is evident from Fig. 5 that the average values of evaluation metrics obtained with proposed feature selection method using statistical test
following rough set are better compared with commonly employed approaches. The proposed attribute selector initially determines a subset
of system calls with high-class dependency/significance. Subsequently, the large population test filters irrelevant system calls to obtain a subset
of system calls having a significant mean difference across the classes to generate a reduced system call set.
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FIGURE 5 Comparisons of average performances of various feature selection methods. IG: Information Gain; CHI: Chi-Square; SU= Symmetrical
Uncertainty; RS (B): Rough set-benign system calls; and RS (M): Rough set- malware system calls.; RSST (B): benign attributes obtained after two-
step feature selection i.e., Rough set followed by large population test; and RSST (M): malware features collected by adopting two-step feature
selection, i.e., Rough set followed by large population test.
(3) Exhaustive experiments performed by us demonstrate that the feature set comprising of few system calls lack its representativeness about the
target classes. In other words, fewer attributes are incapable of exhibiting separation (or numerical variance) between feature vectors. Thus,
the detection rate is also less. This conclusion can be clearly drawn from Fig. 4 especially until 30 system calls. Consequently, the accuracy
and AUC are small with large FPR. Furthermore, the addition of calls in the attribute set increases the difference in feature vectors. Hence, the
prediction capability of classifier also improves, this is visualized for the feature set comprising of 30-50 system calls. However, augmenting
the feature set with additional calls result in the classifier to learn attributes that add noise to the feature set. Hence, the performance remains
steady and gradually tend to decrease. This trend can be perceived for feature-length beyond 50 attributes. The decrease in the performance
is primarily due to the increased variability across the samples resulting in the wrong prediction.
(4) It has been observed that like any security systems/solutions, machine learning basedmalware detectors can be bypassed by adversarial exam-
ples. In general, the adversarial samples are crafted by adding small perturbation so that these examples are misclassified by learned models.
In particular, the adversarial samples are crafted tomatch the distribution of attributes in themalicious and legitimate set. Normally the classi-
fication models developed with permissions and APIs are learned with applications represented in binary values, with the presence of feature
indicated by one and absence is shown with zeros. The perturbations are induced by changing values of some permissions/APIs with zero ele-
ments to ones. These extraneous attributes are included to evade anti-malware systems. Specially, the permission-baseddetectors canbeeasily
bypassed by augmenting AndroidManifest.XML files with extra permissions.
Machine learningmodels created with system calls are difficult to be bypassed with the adversarial examples. To do this, themalware develop-
ersmust learn the statistical difference of each system call from a large collection of surrogate data set. Later, the source code of each appmust
be modified to include certain functionality resulting in the invocation of calls that match the distribution of calls in the benign set. However,
it is difficult to be achieved, as it would require malicious apps consume more execution time. Besides, such samples can be identified without
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substantial effort employing trivial heuristics such as (a) battery used; (b) percentage of CPU utilized; (c) amount of freememory available; and,
(d) calls to extraneous system calls (e.g., get current date/time, list of files/threads/processes, etc.).
(5) We estimated the time required in extracting static features from AndroidManifest.xml and smali code. The total time spent to extract
manifest features (permissions, services, activities, hardware etc.) is observed as 1073 seconds. Hence, per sample time on an average is esti-
mated to be 0.3256 seconds. Also, time invested to gather API and opcodes is determined as 3229 seconds. Thus on an average, time spent for
a single instance is 0.922 seconds. Since dynamic analysis involves execution of an application in an emulated environment, the average time
required to extract system calls is estimated as approximately 3 minutes. Time invested to construct classification model and later generating
results using cross-validation is between 0.425-0.577 seconds for all feature selectors considered in this paper. The minimum time is obtained
for the model developed with CFsSubsetEval, and maximum time of 0.577 seconds is invested for models created using RSST, learned with
malware system calls.
(6) Looking at the performance of classification algorithms, in context of identifying samples and running time, we conclude, the effectiveness of
both Random forest and Rotation in detecting malware samples with the high classification accuracy, i.e., 99.9%. However, on average, exper-
iments with AdaBoost resulted in the best accuracy of 90.19% which is far less than other two algorithms. Essentially Random forest and
Rotation forest assigns the class label of a sample using majority voting. On examining the evaluation metric, we conclude that a fair selection
amongst Random and Rotation forest cannot be made. However, we preferred Random forest over Rotation forest, as the time required for
building classification model with Random forest was observed to be less compared to Rotation forest, refer to Figure 6 . Furthermore, the
running times for Rotation forest increases with the size of attributes set, similar trends were also observed by author in 56.
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8 COMPARISON WITH PRIOR WORKS
In this section, we compare the results of our proposed work with earlier studies. Authors in 57 proposed an Android malware detector known as
M0Droid consisting of two modules client agent and server analyzer. The agent executes in the background and submits the application to the
server, which executes an application in the emulator. During execution, each apk is subjected to random events generated by Android Monkey,
consequently, system calls are recorded. Later, a signature for each application is created, which is represented as a sequence consisting of a pair
of system call identifier and occurrence. Detection of unknown instances is undertaken by comparing the Spearman correlation coefficient with
known signatures in the repository. The experimental study demonstrated 60.16% detection rate with 39.43% FPR on 200 applications.
Xi Xiao 58 et al. considered 196 system calls. To achieve improved classification accuracy, back propagation neural network on Markov chains
from system call sequencewere considered. Each system call was treated as a state thus, corresponding to 196 states. AndroidMonkeywas used to
generate 1000 pseudo-random events and later, stracewas used to record system call events. The analysis was performed to determine optimal
network structure (i.e., depth, hidden–layer and learning parameter), deployed for identifying unseenmalware instances. Thus, assessment of three
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and four layers neural network was carried away. Three hidden layer with 37 nodes resulted in highest F − score of 0.980 at a TPR of 0.974 and
FPR of 0.0134.However, with four-layer network better performancewas achievedwhen thefirst hidden layerwas between450–650. The highest
F − score of 0.982 at TPR of 0.977 and a FPR value of 0.013 was reported. Moreover, better classification outcome was ascertained with 0.7 as
learning rate. The methodology suffers from certain limitations (a) on varying kernel version, the number of system call entries increases. Thus,
classification model with fewer discriminative calls must be determined, otherwise, noisy attributes might result in over parameterization leading
to poor generalization and (b) more the number of system calls, training will become excessively time consuming.
In 59 system call sequences were considered, and insignificant calls were eliminated by determining relative class difference for a system call. Exe-
cution trace of an application was represented using boolean values. The study also considered estimation of mutual information of a system calls
with respect to class labels to ascertain calls representative of a target class. Subsequently, a feature to feature correlationwas also estimatedwhich
was reported to deliver poor results. A malware detection accuracy of 97% was obtained with this approach. The principal limitation we observed
with feature selection approach implemented in paper is the absence of association of class weight with the occurrence of system call.
In 60, authors proposed Feature Extraction and Selection Tool (FEST) for malware detection. The feature extraction module was designed to
extract permissions andAPIs. Subsequently, prominent attributeswerepickedusing theproposed feature selectionalgorithm,FrequenSel. The study
reported an accuracy of 98%, with 2% false positive rate. We implemented a similar version of feature selection algorithm (i.e., FrequenSel) on the
set of system calls extracted from our dataset, and obtained an accuracy of 90.43%, with 8.9% FPR. Also, with 25 and 6 significant system calls
independently extracted from benign andmalware dataset, 89.916%, and 89.635% accuracy is obtained, with 9% and 8.9% FPR.
TABLE 9 Comparative Analysis with PriorWorks.
Prior Approach Metrics Remarks
Works
57
Dynamic analysis, system call identi-
fier along with frequency
Detection rate 60.16%,
39.43% FPR
Analysis performed on limited set of
apks. Attribute selection method is
not employed. Increase in threshold
produced high FNR
58
196 system calls F−score is 0.982,TPR is
0.977 & FPR is 0.013
Malicious call sequence can be dis-
turbed by injecting system calls
found in trusted samples. Training is
expensive.
59
System call sequences accuracy is 97% Feature selection method does not
employ weight of class along with
score assigned to system call.
60
Permissions and APIs 98% accuracy, with 2%
FPR
Same algorithm on system calls
resulted in 90.43% accuracy with
8.9% FPR. The chosen threshold
cannot determine calls that clearly
separates the target classes.
Our
Method
System calls 99.9% accuracy with 1%
FPR using 30 calls
the proposed feature selection
algorithm outperforms conventional
selectors discussed in Section 6.
9 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTION
Our approach carries the general weaknesses of supervised learning model. The proposed method utilizes training data to build the model, under
the assumption that the testing data, which themodel will be applied to, is drawn from the same population as the training data. This assumption is
not true in reality, since the malicious application may evolve. Hence, the model needs to be updated with new training data including new benign
and and malicious applications. The extension of our work will consider the system call sequences and call graph to construct semantic features.
These attributes will be used to classify malware instances to different families. To this end, we may consider creating an iterative classification
system. In this scheme, we plan to developmulti-tier classification approach. Instanceswill be initially classified using a set of classifiers and feature
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selection methods. Misclassified samples from previous layers will be further supplied in the subsequent layers employing diverse classifier and
feature selectors. The features from each layer will be subsequently combined to generate final attribute set which will be used for modeling and
prediction.Wewould like to extend the aforementioned approach employing deep learningmethods.
Finally, we intend to extend our study by evaluating the approach on multiple dataset. Besides, we plan to investigate the robustness of
classification system by incorporating attribute fusion approach by coupling call sequences with other features derived from source code of
applications.
10 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a two-step feature selection approach utilizing predictive capabilities of rough set and a statistical test for determining
relevant system calls. We observed that with 30 significant system calls we could separate malware and goodware (i.e., non-malicious) with 99.9%
accuracy, AUC of 1.0, and 1% FPR. Comprehensive analysis of the proposed feature selector with conventional feature selection methods such as
Information Gain, Symmetric Uncertainty, ChiSquare, and CFsSubsetEval has been performed to test the performance. The results demonstrate
that the proposed feature selection algorithmoutperformed the traditional techniques. Exhaustive experimentswith static attributes derived from
manifest files, smali code, and features obtained using dynamic analysis including network traces, call graph attributes and droidbox information,
suggest that feature set comprising of system calls exhibited better performance.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work is also partially supported by the grant n. 2017-166478 (3696) fromCiscoUniversity Research ProgramFund and Silicon Valley Commu-
nity Foundation, and by the grant "Scalable IoTManagement and Key security aspects in 5G systems" from Intel. Moreover, the work is supported
by the project “Adaptive Failure and QoS-aware Controller over Cloud Data Center to Preserve Robustness and Integrity of the Incoming Traffic”
funded by the University of Padua, Italy.
References
1. Smart phone sale http://www.statista.com/topics/840/smartphones/[Date last accessedMay 2018]; .
2. sophosWebsite http://www.sophos.com/en-us/security-news-trends/whitepapers.aspx[Date last accessedMay 2018]; .
3. Faruki Parvez, Bharmal Ammar, Laxmi Vijay, et al. Android security: a survey of issues,malware penetration, and defenses. IEEE communications
surveys & tutorials. 2015;17(2):998–1022.
4. Amos Brandon, Turner Hamilton,White Jules. Applyingmachine learning classifiers to dynamic androidmalware detection at scale. In: :1666–
1671IEEE; 2013.
5. Gardiner Joseph, Nagaraja Shishir. On the Security of Machine Learning in Malware C&C Detection: A Survey. ACM Comput. Surv..
2016;49(3):59:1–59:39.
6. AndroidMonkey http://developer.android.com/studio/test/monkey.html[Date last accessedMay 2018]; .
7. ZhangMi, Yao JT. A rough sets based approach to feature selection. In: :434–439IEEE; 2004.
8. Świniarski Roman W. Rough sets methods in feature reduction and classification. International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer
Science. 2001;11:565–582.
9. Massey Adam,Miller Steven J. Tests of hypotheses using statistics.Mathematics Department, Brown University, Providence, RI. 2006;2912.
10. Freund Yoav, Schapire Robert, Abe Naoki. A short introduction to boosting. Journal-Japanese Society For Artificial Intelligence. 1999;14(771-
780):1612.
11. Breiman Leo. Random forests.Machine learning. 2001;45(1):5–32.
Deepa K.ET AL 23
12. Kuncheva Ludmila I, Rodríguez Juan J. An experimental study on rotation forest ensembles. In: :459–468Springer; 2007.
13. Droidbox http://github.com/pjlantz/droidbox[Date last accessedMay 2018]; .
14. Arp Daniel, SpreitzenbarthMichael, HubnerMalte, Gascon Hugo, Rieck Konrad, Siemens CERT. DREBIN: Effective and Explainable Detection
of AndroidMalware in Your Pocket.. In: :23–26; 2014.
15. Zhou Yajin, Jiang Xuxian. Dissecting androidmalware: Characterization and evolution. In: :95–109IEEE; 2012.
16. GlodekWilliam, Harang Richard. Rapid permissions-based detection and analysis of mobile malware using random decision forests. In: :980–
985IEEE; 2013.
17. Cen Lei, Gates Christoher S, Si Luo, Li Ninghui. A probabilistic discriminative model for android malware detection with decompiled source
code. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing. 2015;12(4):400–412.
18. Talha Kabakus Abdullah, Alper Dogru Ibrahim, Aydin Cetin. APK Auditor: Permission-based Android malware detection system. Digital
Investigation. 2015;13:1–14.
19. Wang Wei, Li Yuanyuan, Wang Xing, Liu Jiqiang, Zhang Xiangliang. Detecting Android malicious apps and categorizing benign apps with
ensemble of classifiers. Future Generation Computer Systems. 2018;78:987–994.
20. HamHyo-Sik, ChoiMi-Jung. Analysis of androidmalware detection performance usingmachine learning classifiers. In: :490–495IEEE; 2013.
21. Amamra Abdelfattah, Robert Jean-Marc, Abraham Andrien, Talhi Chamseddine. Generative versus discriminative classifiers for android
anomaly-based detection system using system calls filtering and abstraction process. Security and Communication Networks. 2016;9(16):3483–
3495.
22. KimHwan-Hee, ChoiMi-Jung. Linux kernel-based feature selection for Androidmalware detection. In: :1–4IEEE; 2014.
23. Narudin Fairuz Amalina, Feizollah Ali, Anuar Nor Badrul, Gani Abdullah. Evaluation of machine learning classifiers for mobile malware
detection. Soft Computing. 2016;20(1):343–357.
24. Chekina Lena, Mimran Dudu, Rokach Lior, Elovici Yuval, Shapira Bracha. Detection of Deviations in Mobile Applications Network Behavior.
CoRR. 2012;abs/1208.0564.
25. Shabtai Asaf, Kanonov Uri, Elovici Yuval, Glezer Chanan, Weiss Yael. Andromaly: a behavioral malware detection framework for android
devices. Journal of Intelligent Information Systems. 2012;38(1):161–190.
26. Tong Fei, Yan Zheng. A hybrid approach ofmobilemalware detection in Android. Journal of Parallel andDistributed Computing.2017;103:22 - 31.
Special Issue on Scalable Cyber-Physical Systems.
27. Su Xin, Chuah M, Tan Gang. Smartphone dual defense protection framework: Detecting malicious applications in android markets. In: :153–
160IEEE; 2012.
28. Canfora Gerardo,Mercaldo Francesco, Visaggio Corrado Aaron. A classifier of malicious android applications. In: :607–614IEEE; 2013.
29. Rocha Bruno PS, Conti Mauro, Etalle Sandro, Crispo Bruno. Hybrid static-runtime information flow and declassification enforcement. IEEE
transactions on information forensics and security. 2013;8(8):1294–1305.
30. Feldman Stephen, Stadther Dillon,Wang Bing.Manilyzer: automated androidmalware detection throughmanifest analysis. In: :767–772IEEE;
2014.
31. Lin Ying-Dar, Lai Yuan-Cheng, Lu Chun-Nan, Hsu Peng-Kai, Lee Chia-Yin. Three-phase behavior-based detection and classification of known
and unknownmalware. Security and Communication Networks. 2015;8(11):2004–2015.
32. Google Play Store http://play.google.com/store?hl=en[Date last accessedMay 2018]; .
33. Chinese http://www.appinchina.co/market/[Date last accessedMay 2018]; .
34. Koodous http://koodous.com/[Date last accessedMay 2018]; .
24 Deepa K.ET AL
35. 1MobileMarket http://m.1mobile.com/me.onemobile.android.html[Date last accessedMay 2018]; .
36. 9apps http://www.9apps.com/[Date last accessedMay 2018]; .
37. VirusTotal http://www.virustotal.com/[Date last accessedMay 2018]; .
38. Ransomware http://ransom.mobi/[Dateset last accessedMay 2018]; .
39. strace http://linux.die.net/man/1/strace[Date last accessedMay 2018]; .
40. Ramos Juan, others . Using tf-idf to determine word relevance in document queries. In: :133–142; 2003.
41. Hu Xiaohua. Knowledge discovery in databases: an attribute-oriented rough set approach. PhD thesisUniversity of Regina1995.
42. JensenRichard, ShenQiang. Rough set based feature selection:A review.Rough computing: theories, technologies and applications.2007;:70–107.
43. AV-Test http://goo.gl/Rg6NDN[Date last accessedMay 2018]; .
44. WEKA http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/(Data last accessedMay 2018); .
45. Idrees Fauzia, Rajarajan Muttukrishnan, Conti Mauro, Chen Thomas M, Rahulamathavan Yogachandran. PIndroid: A novel Android malware
detection system using ensemble learningmethods. Computers & Security. 2017;68:36–46.
46. Moonsamy Veelasha, Batten Lynn. Zero permission android applications-attacks and defenses. In: :5–9School of Information Systems, Deakin
University; 2012.
47. Narain Sashank, Vo-Huu Triet D, Block Kenneth, Noubir Guevara. Inferring user routes and locations using zero-permissionmobile sensors. In:
:397–413IEEE; 2016.
48. Google TCPDump https://sites.google.com/site/christians310/tcpdump[Date last accessedMay 2018]; .
49. Ruta Dymitr, Gabrys Bogdan. An overview of classifier fusionmethods. Computing and Information systems. 2000;7(1):1–10.
50. Felt Adrienne Porter, Chin Erika, Hanna Steve, Song Dawn,Wagner David. Android permissions demystified. In: :627–638ACM; 2011.
51. RastogiVaibhav, ChenYan, JiangXuxian.Droidchameleon: evaluating android anti-malware against transformation attacks. In: :329–334ACM;
2013.
52. RastogiVaibhav,ChenYan, JiangXuxian.Catchme if youcan: Evaluatingandroid anti-malwareagainst transformationattacks. IEEETransactions
on Information Forensics and Security. 2014;9(1):99–108.
53. Dong Shuaike, Li Menghao, DiaoWenrui, et al. Understanding Android Obfuscation Techniques: A Large-Scale Investigation in theWild. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1801.01633. 2018;.
54. Proguard http://developer.android.com/tools/help/proguard.html(Date last accessedMay 2018); .
55. Dasho http://www.preemptive.com/solutions/android-obfuscation/(Date last accessedMay 2018); .
56. Du Peijun, Samat Alim,Waske Björn, Liu Sicong, Li Zhenhong. Random Forest and Rotation Forest for Fully Polarized SAR Image Classification
using Polarimetric and Spatial Features. ISPRS Journal of Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing. 2015;105:38–53.
57. Damshenas Mohsen, Dehghantanha Ali, Choo Kim-Kwang Raymond, Mahmud Ramlan. M0droid: An android behavioral-based malware
detectionmodel. Journal of Information Privacy and Security. 2015;11(3):141–157.
58. Xiao Xi, Wang Zhenlong, Li Qing, Xia Shutao, Jiang Yong. Back-propagation neural network on Markov chains from system call sequences: a
new approach for detecting Androidmalware with system call sequences. IET Information Security. 2016;11(1):8–15.
59. Canfora Gerardo, Medvet Eric, Mercaldo Francesco, Visaggio Corrado Aaron. Detecting android malware using sequences of system calls. In:
:13–20ACM; 2015.
60. ZhaoKai, ZhangDafang, SuXin, LiWenjia. Fest: A feature extraction and selection tool forAndroidmalwaredetection. In: :714–720IEEE; 2015.
Deepa K.ET AL 25
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY
Deepa K. is currently persuing her Ph.D from Bharathiar University, Coimbatore. She is MCA & MPhil in Computer Sci-
ence fromBharathiarUniversity.Hermain research interestsCyber Securities andMachine Learning.DeepaK. is currently
persuing her Ph.D from Bharathiar University, Coimbatore. She is MCA & MPhil in Computer Science from Bharathiar
University. Hermain research interests Cyber Securities andMachine Learning.
Radhamani G. is presently working as Professor and Director, School of Information Technology and Science, Dr. G R
Damodaran College of Science, affiliated to Bharathiar University, India. Formerly, she worked as Head, Department of IT,
Ministry ofManpower, Sultanate of Oman. Prior to that she served as a Research Associate in IIT (India) and as a faculty in
Department of Information Technology, Multimedia University, Malaysia. She received her M.Sc and M.Phil degrees from
the P.S.G College of Technology, India, Ph.D degree from the Multimedia University, Malaysia. She had been invited to be
Keynote Speaker and Chair for International conferences in India and abroad. She has published papers in International
Journals and Conferences.
Vinod P. is Post Doc at Department of Mathematics, University of Padua, Italy. He holds his Ph.D in Computer Engineer-
ing fromMalaviya National Institute of Technology, Jaipur, India. He has more than 70 research articles published in peer
reviewed Journals and International Conferences. He is reviewer of number of security journals, and has also served
as programme committee member in the International Conferences related to Computer and Information Security. His
current research is involved in the development of malware scanner for mobile application using machine learning tech-
niques. Vinod’s area of interest is Adversarial Machine Learning, Malware Analysis, Context aware privacy persevering
DataMining, Ethical Hacking andNatural Language Processing.
Mohammad Shojafar is an Intel Innovator and senior researcher in SPRITZ Security and Privacy Research Group at the
University of Padua, Italy. Hewas CNIT Senior Researcher at theUniversity of Rome Tor Vergata contributed on European
H2020 “SUPERFLUIDITY” project. Also, he completed some Italian projects named “SAMMClouds”, “V-FoG”, “PRIN15”
projects aim to address some of the open issues related to the Software as a Service (SaaS) and Infrastructure as a Ser-
vice (IaaS) systems In Cloud and Fog computing which are supported by the University of Sapienza Rome and University
of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Italy, respectively. He received the Ph.D. degree from Sapienza University of Rome, Rome,
Italy, in 2016 with an “Excellent” degree. He received the MSc and BSc in QIAU and Iran University Science and Technol-
ogy, Tehran, Iran in 2010 and 2006, respectively. He published over 90 refereed articles is prestigious venues such as IEEE TCC, IEEE TSC and IEEE
TGCN. Hewas a programmer/analyzer at National IranianOil Company (NIOC) and Tidewater ltd in Iran from 2008-2013, respectively.
Neeraj Kumar is currently an Associate Professor in the Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Thapar Uni-
versity, Patiala (Pb.), India. He has published more than 200 technical research papers in leading journals and conferences
from IEEE, Elsevier, Springer, JohnWiley etc. Some of his research findings are published in top cited journals such as IEEE
TIE, IEEE TDSC, IEEE TITS, IEEE TCE, IEEE Netw., IEEE Comm., IEEE WC, IEEE IoTJ, IEEE SJ, FGCS, JNCA, and ComCom.
He has guided many research scholars leading to Ph.D. and M.E./M.Tech. His research is supported by fundings from Tata
Consultancy Service, council of scientific and industrial research, and Department of Science & Technology. He is a senior
member of IEEE and committee member of different societies of ComSoc. He is in the editorial board member of IEEE
Communication Magazine, Journal of Networks and Computer Applications, International Journal of Communication Systems, and Security and
Privacy.
Mauro Conti is Full Professor at the University of Padua, Italy. He obtained his Ph.D. from Sapienza University of Rome,
Italy, in 2009. After his Ph.D., he was a Post-Doc Researcher at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands. In 2011
he joined as Assistant Professor the University of Padua, where he became Associate Professor in 2015. In 2017, he
obtained the national habilitation as Full Professor for Computer Science and Computer Engineering. He has been Visiting
Researcher at GMU (2008, 2016), UCLA (2010), UCI (2012, 2013, 2014), TUDarmstadt (2013), UF (2015), and FIU (2015,
2016). He has been awarded with aMarie Curie Fellowship (2012) by the European Commission, and with a Fellowship by
the German DAAD (2013). His main research interest is in the area of security and privacy. In this area, he publishedmore
than 200 papers in topmost international peer-reviewed journals and conference. He is Associate Editor for several journals, including IEEE Com-
munications Surveys & Tutorials and IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security. Hewas ProgramChair for TRUST 2015, ICISS 2016,
WiSec 2017, and General Chair for SecureComm2012 and ACMSACMAT 2013. He is SeniorMember of the IEEE.
26 Deepa K.ET AL
How to cite this article: Deepa K., Radhamani G., Vinod P., M. Shojafar, N. Kumar, and M. Conti (2018), FeatureAnalytics: An approach to derive
relevant attributes for analyzing AndroidMalware, Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience, 2018;00:1–26.
